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I dare speak confidently and positively of very few things, except of matters 
of fact.  
— Boyle (“A Pröemial Essay”, I, 307).
We have at hand examples of reason judging morally. We can analyze them 
into their elementary concepts and, in default of mathematics, adopt a proce-
dure similar to that of chemistry — the separation, by repeated experiments 
on common human understanding, of the empirical from the rational that 
may be found in them. 
— Kant (KpV, AA 5:163).
Introduction
According	to	a	popular	reading,	Kant’s	aim	in	the	final	section	of	the	
Groundwork (1785)	was	staggeringly	ambitious.	He	was	seeking	a	non-
moral	premise	 that	would	ground	our	 status	 as	 free	 agents,	 and	he	
wanted	 to	 use	 this	 premise	 to	 show	why	 the	moral	 law	 is	 uncondi-
tionally	valid.	But	in	the	second	Critique	(1788),	the	reading	continues,	
Kant	backed	away	from	this	strategy.	He	concluded	that	the	moral	law	
“cannot	be	proved	by	any	deduction”,	although	our	consciousness	of	its	
authority	may	be	called	a	“Fact	of	Reason”	(Faktum der Vernunft)	(KpV, 
AA	5:47,	5:31).	Incredibly,	Kant	then	appealed	to	this	alleged	“fact”	to	
justify	our	status	as	 free	agents,	effectively	arguing	 from	morality	 to	
freedom,	rather	than	from	freedom	to	morality.	Unfortunately	for	Kant,	
this	 reversal	 is	widely	 considered	 an	 abysmal	 failure,	 amounting	 to	
what	some	have	called	“foot-stomping”	and	“moralistic	bluster”.1
1.	 The	first	expression	is	from	Paul	Guyer,	“Naturalistic	and	Transcendental	Mo-
ments”,	462;	the	second	is	from	Allen	Wood,	Kantian Ethics,	135.	Similarly,	in	
Karl	Ameriks’s	view	only	“some	technical	peculiarities”	prevent	us	from	label-
ing	Kant’s	position	in	the	second	Critique	“fundamentally	intuitionistic”	and	to	
this	extent	“he	can	be	said	to	have	encouraged	the	return,	at	least	in	Germany,	
to	 a	 kind	 of	 dogmatic	metaphysics”	 (Kant’s Theory of Mind,	 218–219).	 Scho-
penhauer	drew	 this	 verdict	 long	 ago	—	and	 in	 less	flattering	 terms	—	when	
he	wrote	that	Kant’s	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Reason	opened	a	“gateway”	for	all	
“philosophasters	and	phantasists”	to	bring	forth	their	spurious	theories	(citing	
the	work	of	Jacobi,	Reinhold,	Fichte,	and	Schelling)	(Grundlage,	III.	674).
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chemist”,	he	means	we	can	set	up	thought	experiments	that	illustrate	
the	way	we	separate	duty	from	happiness.	This	provides	a	key	for	ex-
plaining	why	Kant’s	appeal	to	moral	consciousness	in	the	second	Cri-
tique	is	not	dogmatic,	contrary	to	a	prevailing	view	in	the	secondary	lit-
erature.	Another	payoff	to	my	reading,	which	I	will	discuss	in	the	final	
section,	is	that	it	shows	why	Kant’s	strategy	of	justification	shifts	focus	
from	the	theoretical	standpoint	we	adopt	as	philosophers	toward	the	
practical	standpoint	we	adopt	as	ordinary	persons.	It	is	only	when	we	
philosophize	 from	a	practical,	first-personal	perspective	 that	we	can	
understand	what	common	reason	already	knows	“in	its	heart”.	Once	
we	grasp	this,	I	believe,	we	shall	see	why	Kant’s	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	
Reason	is	of	lasting	philosophical	value.4
1. A History of “Fact”
In	the	Romano-canon	tradition,	matters	of	fact	pertained	to	a	sphere	
distinct	from	matters	of	law,	as	expressed	by	the	maxim:	“Da mihi facto 
dabo tibi ius”	(“You	give	me	the	facts,	I	give	you	the	law”),	from	Quintil-
ian’s Institutes of the Orator.5	The	first	entry	in	the	Oxford English Diction-
ary	also	defines	matters	of	fact	as	“that	portion	of	a	subject	of	judicial	
inquiry	which	is	concerned	with	the	truth	or	falsehood	of	alleged	facts”,	
citing	its	first	record	in	English	from	1583	(“He	speaketh	of	a	matter	of	
fact”,	by	Nowell	and	Day).	During	the	Restoration	era,	“facts”	came	to	
4.	 From	 this	 introductory	 sketch,	my	position	may	appear	 to	be	at	odds	with	
commentators	who	read	the	Fact	of	Reason	as	a	kind	of	“act”	or	“deed”,	draw-
ing	from	Kant’s	remark	that	pure	reason	“proves	its	reality	and	that	of	its	con-
cepts	by	what	it	does	[durch die Tat]”	(KpV,	AA	5:3).	See,	for	example,	Willas-
chek	(“Die	Tat	der	Vernunft”),	Engstrom	(“Introduction”),	and	Franks	(All or 
Nothing).	Nevertheless,	I	believe	we	can	reconcile	these	readings	if	we	main-
tain	that	moral	consciousness	only	arises	through	an	original	act	of	reason’s	
self-determination.	This	would	still	make	moral	consciousness	the	primary	ref-
erent	of	Kant’s	Faktum,	but	it	would	preserve	the	important	insight	by	Willas-
chek,	Engstrom,	and	Franks	that	the	moral	law	is	one	we	actively	give	to	our-
selves.	Moreover,	the	scientific	sense	of	“fact”	I	shall	uncover	from	the	work	
of	Boyle	and	others	is	consistent	with	the	“deed	of	reason”	interpretation,	for	
the	whole	enterprise	of	producing	and	reproducing	natural	phenomena	via	
experiment	has	an	active	character.	Thanks	to	two	reviewers	of	this	journal	
for	pressing	me	to	clarify	these	issues.
5.	 Cited	in	Shapiro,	Culture of Fact,	9.
In	this	paper,	my	aim	is	to	offer	a	more	charitable	reading	of	Kant’s	
strategy	of	justification	in	the	second	Critique.2	I	will	do	so,	however,	
by	 taking	what	may	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 unlikely	 detour:	working	 from	
the	 traditions	 of	 Romano-canon	 and	 English	 common	 law;	 to	 the	
works	 of	 the	 British	 experimentalists	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century;	
and	finally,	 to	 the	German	translation	of	Bishop	Butler’s	Analogy of 
Religion	in	1756.	While	my	ultimate	concern	here	is	to	defend	a	new	
systematic	reading	of	Kant’s	Faktum	(sections	3–4),	I	believe	that	trac-
ing	 the	history	of	 “fact”	 through	 these	phases	 is	 necessary	 for	 put-
ting	his	 argument	 in	 its	proper	 context	 (sections	 1–2).	As	we	 shall	
see,	Kant’s	Faktum	shares	the	meaning	of	a	“matter	of	fact”	(Tatsache),3 
referring	 to	 the	 reality	of	our	moral	 consciousness;	 and	 like	a	 “Tat-
sache”,	it	is	something	we	can	attest	to	with	the	aid	of	Kant’s	thought	
experiments.	Later	on	I	will	address	a	few	possible	objections	to	this	
reading	(sections	5–6),	one	of	which	I	anticipate	coming	from	Dieter	
Henrich	and	Ian	Proops,	who	have	argued	that	Kant’s	Faktum	is	best	
understood	under	a	legal	analogy.
The	reading	I	wish	to	defend	in	this	paper	has	two	significant	pay-
offs.	One	 is	 that	 it	 shows	why	Kant’s	mysterious	 allusions	 to	 chem-
istry	 in	 the	 second	Critique	 are	of	 central	 importance	 (KpV	AA	5:92;	
cf.	 5:163).	When	 Kant	 says	 a	 philosopher	 has	 an	 advantage	 “like	 a	
2.	 The	question	of	whether	Kant	changed	his	strategy	of	justification	by	the	time	
he	wrote	the	second	Critique	 lies	beyond	the	scope	of	 this	paper.	For	advo-
cates	of	a	reversal	reading,	see	Beck,	Commentary;	Ameriks,	“Kant’s	Deduction	
of	Freedom	and	Morality”;	Korsgaard,	“Morality	as	Freedom”;	Rawls,	“Themes	
in	Kant’s	Moral	Philosophy”;	Allison,	Kant’s Theory of Freedom;	Łuków,	“Kant’s	
Passage	to	Ordinary	Moral	Knowledge”;	Sussman,	“Kant’s	Grounding	of	the	
Moral	Law”;	and	Timmermann,	“Reversal	or	Retreat?”.	For	advocates	of	a	con-
tinuity	reading,	see	Henrich,	“Faktum	der	Vernunft”,	Tenenbaum,	“The	Idea	
of	Freedom	and	Moral	Cognition	in	Groundwork	III”,	and	Wood,	“Preface	and	
Introduction	(3–16)”.
3.	 I	am	not	the	first	to	read	the	Fact	of	Reason	as	a	kind	of	Tatsache	(see,	e. g.,	Re-
inhold,	Beyträge,	Cohen,	Kants Begründung,	and	Kleingeld,	“Moral	Conscious-
ness”).	 Yet	 to	my	 knowledge	 no	 one	 has	 investigated	 the	Faktum/Tatsache 
connection	through	the	history	of	“fact”.	As	we	shall	see,	while	Kant’s	Faktum 
does	not	admit	of	proof	by	deduction,	it	admits	of	illustration	by	experiment.	
For	indications	of	where	my	reading	overlaps	with	or	diverges	from	existing	
accounts	in	the	secondary	literature,	see	notes	4,	23,	25,	and	26	below.
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of	certainty	found	in	logic	or	mathematics	was	no	longer	a	plausible	
goal.9	In	many	ways	advocates	of	the	experimental	method	wanted	to	
rethink	proof	and	certainty	according	to	an	increasingly	modest	frame-
work	of	explanation.	Boyle,	for	example,	did	not	claim	to	understand	
the	causal	mechanism	of	air	through	his	experiments.	Rather,	he	only	
claimed	to	witness	its	effects	through	the	technology	of	the	air-pump.	
This	shift	was	essential	for	members	of	the	Royal	Society	who	wanted	
to	secure	a	foundation	of	probable	knowledge	while	avoiding	conten-
tious	issues	about	causality.10
By	the	time	Locke	wrote	his	Essay	at	the	close	of	the	seventeenth	
century,	 this	 new	way	 of	 thinking	was	 common	 currency.	 Yet	 there	
is	no	question	that	Locke	contributed	to	this	shift	by	raising	the	con-
cept	of	“fact”	to	a	philosophical	category.	In	the	chapter	of	the	Essay 
devoted	 to	degrees	of	 assent,	 Locke	 identified	a	matter	of	 fact	with	
“some	particular	Existence”	capable	of	observation	and	testimony,	al-
lowing	us	 to	 “reason	 and	 act	 thereupon	with	 as	 little	 doubt,	 as	 if	 it	
were	perfect	demonstration”	(E,	IV.xvi,	6).	As	he	explained:	“Thus,	if	
all	English-men,	who	have	occasion	to	mention	it,	should	affirm,	that	
it	 froze	in	England	 the	last	Winter,	or	that	there	were	Swallows	seen	
there	in	the	Summer,	I	think	a	Man	could	almost	as	little	doubt	of	it,	as	
that	Seven	and	Four	are	Eleven”	(E,	IV.xvi,	6).	As	a	category	of	knowl-
edge,	matters	of	fact	did	not	admit	of	strict	proof	—	the	kind	we	find	in	
9.	 See	Serjeantson,	“Proof	and	Persuasion”,	esp.	159–160.
10.	Although	Bacon	was	the	first	to	transfer	juridical	methods	into	natural	phi-
losophy,	it	was	Boyle	who	developed	a	strategy	of	proof	specific	to	English	
common	 law,	 the	 strategy	 of	 multiplying	 witness	 testimony.	 See	 Shapin,	
“Boyle’s	 Literary	 Technology”;	 Shapin	 and	 Schaffer,	 Leviathan and the Air-
Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and Experimental Life;	 Serjeantson,	 “Testimony	 and	
Proof	in	Early-Modern	England”;	and	Shapiro,	“The	Concept	‘Fact’”,	Culture 
of Fact,	and	“Testimony”.	Very	often	 the	 technology	of	 the	experiment	was	
so	rare	—	as	with	Boyle’s	air-pump	—	that	only	a	few	individuals	could	ever	
experience	 the	 effects	 first-hand.	 As	 Shapin	 has	 argued,	 Boyle	 attempted	
to	 supplement	 the	 absence	 of	 first-hand	witnesses	with	 literary	 technolo-
gies	—	his	own	written	reports	and	illustrations	of	the	case	—	that	would	re-
produce	at	a	public	 level	 the	 results	discovered	by	only	a	 few	 individuals.	
Every	reader	of	Boyle’s	reports	could	in	theory	retrace	the	steps	of	the	experi-
ment	and	judge	its	success	or	failure	—	as	if	he	or	she	were	present	(Shapin,	
“Boyle’s	Literary	Technology”,	493).
acquire	a	more	fixed	meaning	in	criminal	courts,	often	referring	to	the	
acts	and	deeds	of	the	accused	(coming	from	the	Latin	factum,	“some-
thing	done”).	Facts	in	this	sense	required	proof.	Quite	distinct	from	the	
meaning	they	would	later	acquire,	facts	were	not	objects	of	reasonable	
belief,	but	items	of	evidence	to	be	determined	by	a	jury.	Thus,	in	Eng-
lish	common	law,	“matters	of	fact”	referred	to	what	the	accused	had	
done	(for	example,	when	he	was	last	seen	on	the	night	of	the	murder),	
yet	their	domain	was	still	one	of	alleged	truth.
While	it	is	difficult	to	say	when	the	concept	acquired	a	privileged	
epistemic	 status,	 early	 modern	 historians	 were	 key	 in	 shifting	 the	
meaning	of	“fact”.	For	historians	of	the	time,	the	relevant	contrast	was	
not	between	matters	of	fact	and	matters	of	law,	but	between	matters	
of	fact	and	matters	of	opinion.	John	Selden,	for	example,	described	his	
Historie of Tithes	as	a	collection	of	“such	things	of	fact”,	and	others	wrote	
that	a	faithful	historian	must	report	“nothing	but	fact”.6	However,	the	
concept	did	not	yet	enjoy	an	elevated	status.	As	Francis	Bacon	viewed	
the	matter,	 “a	belief	of	history	 (as	 the	 lawyers	speak,	matter	of	 fact)”	
and	a	“matter	of	art	and	opinion”	belong	to	the	same	category:	that	of	
“things	weakly	authorized”.7	In	this	respect	historical	facts	required	fur-
ther	evidence	to	warrant	assent	from	others.	The	job	of	the	historian,	
like	the	lawyer,	was	to	convince	his	audience	of	matters	of	fact;	and	
in	both	cases	personal	observation	and	reliable	testimony	carried	the	
burden	of	proof.
During	the	seventeenth	century,	the	concept	of	“fact”	found	a	new	
home	in	the	work	of	Robert	Boyle,	Robert	Hooke,	Joseph	Glanvill,	and	
other	members	of	 the	Royal	Society	of	London.	One	point	 scholars	
agree	upon	is	that	the	practice	of	giving	testimony	in	courts	of	law	was	
consciously	imitated	by	the	British	experimentalists	in	their	efforts	to	
redefine	the	boundaries	of	scientific	methodology.8	Within	 this	new	
context,	appeals	to	fact	were	considered	appropriate	because	the	kind	
6.	 Cited	in	Shapiro,	Culture of Fact,	40.
7.	 Bacon,	The Advancement of Learning,	288.
8.	 See	Shapiro,	“Testimony”,	esp.	250–251.
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on	the	basis	of	fact	to	establish	a	conclusive	proof	of	the	doctrine	of	
a	future	state	of	rewards	and	punishments	(A,	I.26,	369).12	Still	work-
ing	within	 Locke’s	 framework	—	where	 facts	 rise	 “so	 near	 to	Certain-
ty”	—	Butler	gave	the	concept	a	new	twist.	If	natural	religion	is	based	
on	matters	of	fact	—	for	example,	that	we	actually	possess	a	moral	fac-
ulty	of	judgment	—	and	if	such	facts	are	consistent	with	the	doctrines	
of	revealed	religion,	then	we	have	sufficient	reason	to	believe	those	
doctrines	are	true.
In	the	absence	of	demonstrative	proof,	we	have	what	Butler	called	
practical	proof:	“fully	sufficient,	in	reason,	to	influence	the	actions	of	
men,	who	act	upon	thought	and	reflection”	(A,	I.20,	156).	Of	course,	
the	notion	of	practical	proof	assumes	that	we	are	free	in	our	actions;	
and	Butler	was	aware	of	the	objection	that	we	are	dictated	by	causes	
beyond	our	control,	 the	 “objection	 from	Necessity”.	Yet	 in	his	view	
the	objection	has	no	significance;	it	only	arises	from	the	standpoint	
of	 abstract	 speculation.	 From	 the	 standpoint	 of	 real	 deliberation,	
Butler	argued,	we	are	already	conscious	of	a	“rule	of	action”	within	
ourselves	—	a	rule,	moreover,	 “of	a	very	peculiar	kind:	 for	 it	carries	
in	it	authority	and	a	right	of	direction;	authority	in	such	a	sense,	as	
that	we	cannot	depart	from	it	without	being	self-condemned”	(A,	I.26,	
150).	This	is	a	“matter	of	fact”	that	no	amount	of	speculation	can	call	
into	question.
Despite	 the	 affinities	 in	 their	 thinking,	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	
Kant	ever	read	Butler.	Nevertheless,	 there	are	good	reasons	to	think	
the	English	bishop	had	an	indirect	influence	on	the	German	philoso-
pher.	The	mediating	link	was	Spalding	himself,	whose	best-seller,	The 
Vocation of Humankind	(first	published	in	1748),	bears	the	unmistakable	
imprint	of	Butler’s	theistic	claims.	In	this	work	Spalding	argued,	 like	
Butler,	that	we	can	infer	God’s	plan	for	us	by	reflecting	on	features	of	
human	life	in	the	present.	The	sense	of	injustice	everyone	feels,	for	ex-
ample,	when	vice	goes	unpunished	or	virtue	unrewarded	must	guide	
a	reflective	person	to	the	conclusion	that	such	oversights	will	be	made	
12.	 See	also	Russell,	“Butler’s	‘Future	State’	and	Hume’s	‘Guide	of	Life’”.
logic	or	mathematics	—	yet	they	came	close	to	commanding	the	same	
degree	of	assent.	“These	Probabilities	rise	so	near	to	Certainty”,	Locke	
concluded,	 “that	 they	 govern	our	Thoughts	 as	 absolutely,	 and	 influ-
ence	all	our	Actions	as	fully,	as	the	most	evident	Demonstration:	and	
in	what	concerns	us,	we	make	little	or	no	difference	between	them	and	
certain	Knowledge”	(E,	IV.xvi,	6).
This	historical	overview	shows	just	how	much	the	meaning	of	“fact”	
changed	over	the	course	of	the	early	modern	period.	In	the	Romano-
canon	 tradition,	matters	 of	 fact	 were	 distinguished	 from	matters	 of	
law,	 referring	 to	 human	 actions	 relevant	 to	 judicial	 inquiry.	 In	 Eng-
lish	common	law	the	term	became	more	fixed,	referring	to	the	alleged	
acts	and	deeds	of	the	accused.	While	the	expression	spread	rapidly	to	
other	contexts	over	the	course	of	the	seventeenth	century,	the	British	
experimentalists	were	vital	in	shifting	the	reference	of	facts	from	hu-
man	deeds	 to	natural	phenomena.	 In	 their	hands,	 facts	were	effects	
(often	reproduced	through	experiment)	that	warranted	the	scientist’s	
full	 conviction.	Over	a	period	of	 two-hundred	years,	 then,	 the	 legal	
sense	of	fact	gave	way	to	what	may	be	called	a	“scientific”	sense,	com-
ing	 to	 signify	natural	 phenomena	one	 could	 attest	 to	with	 certainty,	
even	without	claiming	to	know	their	underlying	causes.11	By	the	time	
of	Locke’s	Essay,	facts	were	no	longer	alleged,	doubtful,	and	in	need	of	
proof.	They	were	actual,	immediately	certain,	and	firmly	established.
2. “Facts”: From England to Germany
2.1. Butler, Spalding, and “Facts of Consciousness”
‘Matters	of	fact’	(Tatsachen)	entered	the	German	language	rather	late	
in	the	eighteenth	century.	The	expression	was	coined	by	the	German	
theologian	Johann	Joachim	Spalding	in	his	1756	translation	of	Butler’s	
Analogy of Religion,	first	published	in	1736.	In	this	work	Butler	vigorous-
ly	defended	the	compatibility	of	natural	and	revealed	religion,	arguing	
11.	 For	a	related	claim,	see	Johnston,	“The	Natural	History	of	Fact”.	I	have	also	
benefited	from	Austin’s	(“Unfair	to	Facts”)	interpretation	of	the	OED	entry	
on	‘fact’.
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perhaps	play	a	role	in	responding	to	scepticism”.15	In	this	respect,	too,	
the	original	 influence	of	Spalding’s	 translation	 is	easy	 to	detect.	At	
key	moments	in	the	Analogy	Butler	linked	“facts”	to	the	felt	quality	of	
our	cognitive	activities.	As	he	explained,	“that	the	three	angles	of	a	
triangle	are	equal	to	two	right	ones,	is	an	abstract	truth:	but	that	they	
appear	so	to	our	mind,	is	only	a	matter	of	fact”	(A,	I.26,	368;	my	em-
phasis).	Butler	also	insisted	that	this	is	beyond	doubt.	The	way	a	geo-
metrical	proposition	appears	to	the	mind	“must	have	been	admitted”,	
he	wrote,	“if	any	thing	was,	by	those	ancient	sceptics,	who	would	not	
have	admitted	the	former	[i. e.,	the	‘abstract	truth’]:	but	pretended	to	
doubt,	Whether	there	were	any	such	thing	as	truth,	or	Whether	we	
could	certainly	depend	upon	our	faculties	of	understanding	for	the	
knowledge	of	it	in	any	case”	(A,	I.26,	368).
2.2. “Facts” in Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy
We	 shall	 see	 that	Kant	 gives	 a	 very	 similar	 characterization	of	 the	
Fact	of	Reason	in	the	second	Critique.	But	first	 I	would	like	to	offer	
concrete	evidence	of	his	familiarity	with	‘Tatsache’	as	a	technical	term.	
To	start	with,	there	is	a	Reflexion	from	the	late	1770s	where	Kant	dis-
tinguishes	“matters	of	opinion”	(Sachen der Meynung),	“matters	of	be-
lief”	(Glaubenssachen),	and	“matters	of	fact”	(Tatsachen)	(Refl	2765).16 
Clearly,	 this	 division	 captures	 a	 progression	 from	what	 is	 less	 cer-
tain	(opinion)	to	what	is	more	certain	(fact),	very	much	in	line	with	
the	sense	of	“fact”	we	have	seen	the	British	experimentalists	employ.	
Other	texts	show	that	by	a	Tatsache Kant	understands	what	is	actual,	
given,	and	incontestable.	In	an	essay	from	the	late	1780s,	for	example,	
he	writes:	“how	much	less	can	a	merely	arbitrary	surmise	be	placed	
against	facts!”	(ÜGTP,	AA	8:176),	and	elsewhere:	“The	basic	principle,	
that	all	knowledge	begins	solely	from	experience,	involves	a	quaestio 
facti,	and	 is	 thus	not	at	 issue	here,	 since	 the	 fact	 [Tatsache]	 is	unre-
servedly	granted”	(Progress,	AA	20:276).
15.	 Franks,	 “Transcendental	Arguments,	Reason,	and	Skepticism”,	 124.	See	also	
Franks,	“Skepticism,	Naturalism,	and	Nihilism”,	esp.	56,	note	11.
16.	 The	specific	date	of	this	Reflexion	is	unknown.
up	for	in	a	future	state,	leading	to	the	belief:	“I	am	therefore	created	
for	another	 life”.13	Spalding’s	book	also	sparked	a	major	controversy	
among	German	theologians	during	the	1770s	and	1780s	on	the	ques-
tion	 of	 humankind’s	 “vocation”	 (Bestimmung),	 and	 both	 sides	 of	 the	
controversy	appealed	to	Tatsachen	for	support.14	On	Spalding’s	side,	for	
example,	Moses	Mendelssohn	argued	that	 if	we	want	to	know	what	
designs	Providence	has	 in	 store	 for	us,	we	 should	not	 “work	up	hy-
potheses”	but	only	look	to	what	“actually	happens”,	that	is,	to	“matters	
of	fact”	(Tatsachen)	(J,	II,	6).
By	 the	 1790s,	 the	 concept	 developed	 further	 to	 include	 what	
philosophers	working	 in	wake	of	Kant’s	philosophy	called	“facts	of	
consciousness”	(Tatsachen des Bewusstseins).	Karl	Reinhold	used	this	
phrase,	 for	 instance,	 to	designate	 “a	 kind	of	 evidence	 that	was	nei-
ther	deductive	nor	inductive	but	nevertheless	valid,	and	that	could	
13.	 Spalding,	Bestimmung,	192.	For	helpful	discussions	of	Spalding’s	influence	on	
German	 theology	 and	philosophy	 in	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century,	 see	Zam-
mito,	Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology;	di	Giovanni,	Freedom and Re-
ligion;	Brandt,	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant;	Munzel,	Kant’s Concep-
tion of Pedagogy;	Tippmann,	Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Johann Joachim 
Spalding;	and	Printy,	“Spalding	and	the	Protestant	Enlightenment”.	See	also	di	
Giovanni,	“The	Year	1786”.
14.	 The	same	is	true	for	the	so-called	“fragments	controversy”	(Fragmentenstreit)	
that	 erupted	after	Lessing	published	parts	of	Hermann	Samuel	Reimarus’s	
manuscript	 under	 the	 title	 “Fragments	 from	 an	 Unnamed	 Author”.	 In	 this	
manuscript	Reimarus	wanted	to	use	the	Gospels’	diverging	accounts	of	the	
Resurrection	to	challenge	doctrines	of	revealed	religion.	Among	the	defend-
ers	of	Lutheran	Orthodoxy,	Johann	Heinrich	Ress	made	an	important	reply	
with	his	book	Geschichte Jesu Christi. At	one	point,	for	example,	Ress	affirmed:	
“My	principle	is:	there	is	no	objection	to	experience	and	matters	of	fact	[…]	It	
is	experience	that	the	magnet	attracts	iron;	and	all	metaphysical	and	physical	
reasons	do	not	dispute	it.	It	is	a	matter	of	fact	that	Christ	rose	again,	because	
we	have	the	gospel	—	a	sure	success	of	this	great	incident	—	which	it	brings	
almost	before	our	eyes”	(Es ist Tatsache, da Christus auserstanden, denn wir haben 
Evangelium, ein so sicherer Erfolg dieses groen Vorfalls, da er ihn uns beinahe vor die 
Augen bringt)	 (Geschichte Jesu Christi,	 172;	my	 translation).	Ress	was	not	 the	
only	author	of	 the	 time	 to	 characterize	 the	Resurrection	as	a	Tatsache.	 See	
also	Lavater,	Geheimes Tagebuch von einem Beobachter seiner selbst,	esp.	151;	and	
Starck,	Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche des Ersten Jahrhunderts,	esp.	864.
	 oȸen	ȸȢre Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason
philosophers’	imprint	 –		6		–	 vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014)
to	empirical	sources.	Yet	Kant	thinks	there	is	a	positive	claim	we	can	
draw	from	this.	If	we	actually	possess	synthetic	a	priori	cognition,	we	
can	infer	that	it	must	have	a	pure	source,	because	experience	does	not	
teach	us	necessity.	After	all,	no	empirical	faculty	could	have	generated	
this	cognition	within	us	(a	point	I	will	consider	in	more	detail	below).
Even	so,	Kant’s	positive	claim	invites	us	to	ask:	What	proof	do	we	
have	that	we	possess	synthetic	a	priori	cognition?	In	the	B	edition	of	
the	first	Critique,	Kant	answers	this	in	a	rather	striking	way.	Instead	of	
demonstrating	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition	using	a	method	
of	deduction,	we	find	him	illustrating	it	using	a	method	of	experiment.	
Speaking	now	to	the	reader,	he	writes:
Gradually	 remove	 from	 your	 experiential	 concept	 of	 a	
body	 everything	 that	 is	 empirical	 in	 it	—	the	 color,	 the	
hardness	or	softness,	the	weight,	even	the	impenetrabil-
ity	—	there	still	 remains	 the	space	 that	was	occupied	by	
the	body	(which	has	now	entirely	disappeared),	and	you	
cannot	leave	that	out.	Likewise,	if	you	remove	from	your	
empirical	concept	of	every	object,	whether	corporeal	or	
incorporeal,	 all	 those	 properties	 of	 which	 experience	
teaches	you,	you	could	still	not	take	from	it	that	by	means	
of	which	 you	 think	of	 it	 as	 a	 substance	 […]	Thus,	 con-
vinced	by	the	necessity	with	which	this	concept	presses	
itself	on	you,	you	must	concede	that	it	has	its	seat	in	your	
faculty	of	cognition	a priori.	(B6)18
18.	 Initially	we	might	think	Kant	is	advancing	a	psychological	claim	in	this	pas-
sage,	saying	that	we	cannot	conceive	the	absence	of	space,	for	example,	due	
to	our	peculiar	cognitive	makeup.	Yet	on	closer	inspection	it	is	clear	he	has	
a	different	sense	of	“necessity”	in	mind,	one	that	is	properly	epistemic.	 I	am	
borrowing	 this	 terminology	 from	Henry	Allison	 (Kant’s Transcendental Ideal-
ism,	esp.	104–105).	In	the	first	Critique	Kant	further	says	that	the	necessity	of	
space	grounds	 the	 “apodictic	certainty”	of	geometrical	principles.	For	 if	we	
drew	our	representation	of	space	from	experience	(i. e.,	“from	general	outer	
experience”),	geometrical	principles	would	have	 the	 same	contingency	we	
find	in	perception.	We	could	not	say,	for	example,	that	a	straight	line	is	neces-
sarily	the	shortest	distance	between	two	points,	only	that	experience	always	
teaches	us	that	(A24/B39).
There	are	also	places	where	Kant	uses	‘Faktum’	in	the	same	way.17	In	
the	B	edition	of	the	first	Critique,	published	in	1787,	Kant	twice	claims	
that	our	possession	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition	is	a	fact,	using	‘Tat-
sache’	in	the	first	passage	and	‘Faktum’	in	the	second:
Now	it	is	easy	to	show	that	in	human	cognition	there	actu-
ally	are	such	necessary	and	in	the	strictest	sense	universal,	
thus	pure	a priori	judgments.	If	one	wants	an	example	from	
the	sciences,	one	need	only	look	at	all	the	propositions	of	
mathematics;	 if	one	would	have	one	from	the	common-
est	use	of	the	understanding,	the	proposition	that	every	
alteration	must	have	a	cause	will	do	[…]	[So]	we	can	con-
tent	ourselves	with	having	displayed	[dargelegt]	the	pure	
use	of	our	cognitive	faculty	as	a	fact	[den reinen Gebrauch 
unseres Erkenntnivermgens als Tatsache].	(B5)
The famous	Locke,	from	neglect	of	this	consideration,	and	
because	he	encountered	pure	concepts	of	the	understand-
ing	in	experience,	also	derived	them	from	this	experience.	
The	empirical derivation,	 however,	 [to	which	Hume	 re-
sorted	as	well],	cannot	be	reconciled	with	the	reality	of	the	
scientific	cognition	a priori that	we	possess,	 that	namely	
of	pure mathematics	and	general	natural science,	and	is	
therefore	refuted	by	the	fact	[Faktum].	(B127–128)
Setting	details	aside,	Kant’s	point	in	these	passages	is	clear.	Synthetic	
a	priori	cognition	 is	not	something	we	can	doubt,	 since	we	actually	
possess	it	 in	pure	mathematics	and	general	natural	science.	By	itself,	
this	 should	 shake	any	 confidence	we	might	have	 in	 the	naturalistic	
programs	of	Locke	or	Hume,	who	would	like	to	reduce	pure	concepts	
17.	 In	another	Reflexion,	this	time	from	the	late	1790s,	Kant	writes	that	the	idea	
of	participating	in	a	cosmopolitan	world	must	be	the	“wish”	(Wünsch)	of	all	
rational	human	beings,	describing	this	as	a	Faktum	whose	reality	we	can	call	
all	persons	to	witness	(“ein Faktum, über dessen Wirklichkeit man alle Menschen 
zu Zeugen rufen kann”)	(Refl	8077).
	 oȸen	ȸȢre Rethinking Kant’s Fact of Reason
philosophers’	imprint	 –		7		–	 vol.	14,	no.	32	(november	2014)
Second,	in	view	of	the	historical	observations	sketched	earlier,	it	is	
noteworthy	that	Kant	identifies	a	mode	of	cognition as	a	“fact”.	With	
members	of	the	Royal	Society,	as	we	have	seen,	matters	of	fact	shifted	
in	 reference	 from	human	deeds	 to	natural	phenomena.	 In	Germany,	
nearly	a	century	later,	 the	concept	was	shifting	yet	again,	coming	to	
signify	mental	states	accessible	to	any	reflective	human	being.	 Inter-
estingly,	the	passages	I	have	cited	above	still	show	Kant’s	debt	to	the	
experimentalist	tradition:	he	is	only	willing	to	identify	mental	states	as	
‘Tatsache’	if	they	are	actual,	immediately	certain,	and	prior	to	specula-
tion.20	So	while	the	German	phrase	was	increasingly	associated	with	
facts	 of	 consciousness	—	accessible	 first-personally	—	‘Tatsache’	 re-
tained	the	elevated	status	Boyle	and	others	had	originally	conferred	
on	the	term.21
20.	Of	course,	Kant	does	not	make	his	debt	to	this	tradition	a	secret.	In	the	first	
Critique	he	claims	that	it	was	“the	ingenious	Francis	Bacon”	who	was	partly	
responsible	for	putting	natural	philosophy	onto	the	path	of	science	(Bxix).	
In	 Kant’s	 view,	 the	 examples	 of	 mathematics	 and	 natural	 science	 “were	
remarkable	enough	 that	we	might	 reflect	on	 the	essential	element	 in	 the	
change	in	the	ways	of	thinking	that	has	been	so	advantageous	to	them,	and,	
at	least	as	an	experiment,	imitate	it	insofar	as	their	analogy	with	metaphys-
ics,	 as	 rational	 cognition,	might	 permit”	 (Bxv–xvi).	 Further	 references	 to	
the	experimental	method	run	throughout	the	first	Critique	(see	also	Bxviii;	
Bxxxviii;	A356;	A804/B832;	A821/B849;	A826/B854;	A838/B866).	Perhaps	
the	most	striking	occurs	in	a	footnote	at	Bxxi.	After	characterizing	how	we	
should	 emulate	 the	 revolution	of	 the	 sciences	 in	metaphysics,	Kant	 says:	
“This	method,	 imitated	 from	 the	method	of	 those	who	 study	nature,	 thus	
consists	in	this:	to	seek	the	elements	of	pure	reason	in	that	which admits 
of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment”.	For	further	discus-
sion,	see	Vanzo,	“Kant	on	Experiment”.
21.	 Here	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	Schopenhauer	criticized	Kant’s	immediate	
successors	(Reinhold	specifically)	for	characterizing	the	moral	law	as	an	“im-
mediately	certain	Faktum”	(unmittelbar gewisses Faktum)	and	an	“original	Tat-
sache	of	moral	consciousness”	(ursprüngliche Tatsache des moralischen Bewuss-
teins).	Schopenhauer	believed	this	contradicted	Kant’s	explicit	warning	from	
the	Groundwork	 that	we	cannot	derive	 the	moral	 law	“from	some	particular 
property of human nature”	(GMS,	AA	4:425).	If	we	render	the	moral	law	a	fact	of	
consciousness,	Schopenhauer	wrote,	“then	it	would	be	grounded	anthropolog-
ically	through	experience,	albeit	inner	experience,	and	thus	empirically;	which	
goes	directly	against	Kant’s	view	and	is	repeatedly	rejected	by	him”	(Grund-
lage,	III.	665;	my	translation).	However,	I	believe	Schopenhauer	was	mistaken	
to	read	the	concept	of	a	fact	in	a	narrow	sense,	i. e.,	as	a	psychological	fact	of	
By	 having	 us	 employ	 a	 procedure	 of	 abstraction,	 Kant	 wants	 us	 to	
see	 that	 certain	 cognitions	are	necessary	 for	 experience.	We	cannot	
conceive	the	absence	of	space,	for	example,	so	the	representation	of	
space	must	be	necessary	for	the	way	we	apprehend	outer	appearances.	
Granting	that	such	epistemic	necessity	is	not	something	that	could	arise	
from	an	empirical	faculty,	we	must	concede	that	it	came	from	a	pure	
faculty.	 In	this	way,	 the	aim	of	Kant’s	 thought	experiment	 is	 to	elicit	
our	actual	consciousness	of	epistemic	necessity,	so	that	when	we	ask,	
“How	is	this	consciousness	possible?”	we	are	led	directly	to	its	source,	
whether	 in	 a	 pure	 faculty	 of	 intuition	 (as	with	 ‘space’)	 or	 in	 a	 pure	
faculty	of	understanding	(as	with	‘substance’).	In	the	next	section	we	
shall	see	that	Kant	uses	a	very	similar	thought	experiment	in	the	sec-
ond	Critique,	one	that	serves	to	illustrate	our	actual	consciousness	of	
the	moral	law.	The	point	of	the	experiment,	I	will	argue,	is	to	show	that	
we	must	possess	a	pure	or	“higher”	faculty	of	desire	—	a	faculty	where	
reason	(and	not	inclination)	determines	the	will.19
3. The Fact of Reason in the Second Critique
Let	me	draw	two	general	observations	from	the	texts	gathered	so	far.	
First,	it	is	clear	from	both	his	published	and	unpublished	writings	that	
Kant	uses	‘Faktum’	and	‘Tatsache’	in	the	newer,	scientific	sense	(i. e.,	of	
something	 actually	 the	 case,	 and	 so	 demanding	 no	 proof),	 in	 con-
trast	to	the	older,	 legal	sense	(i. e.,	of	something	allegedly	done,	and	
so	capable	of	proof).	Kant	foreshadows	this	in	his	1783	Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics	when	he	claims	to	be	starting	with	something	
“already	known	to	be	dependable”,	namely,	the	propositions	of	math-
ematics	and	natural	science,	some	of	which	are	“apodictically	certain”	
through	reason	alone	(Prol,	AA	4:275).	As	he	says:	“We	have	some	at	
least	uncontested synthetic	cognition	a priori,	and	we	do	not	need	to	ask	
whether	it	is	possible	(for	it	is	actual)”	(Prol,	AA	4:275).
19.	 As	Kant	puts	it,	only	“insofar	as	reason	of	itself	(not	in	the	service	of	the	incli-
nations)	determines	the	will,	is	reason	a	true	higher faculty	of	desire”	(KpV, AA 
5:24–25).
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In	 the	 example	 discussed	 earlier	 (from	B6),	Kant	 argued	 that	 space	
is	not	 something	we	can	abstract	 from	a	body,	making	 space	neces-
sary	for	our	representation	of	a	body.	Moreover,	because	this	kind	of	
epistemic	necessity	 is	 not	 something	we	 can	 learn	 from	experience	
(and	 so	does	not	 spring	 from	an	empirical	 faculty),	we	are	 justified	
to	infer	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	faculty	of	intuition.	In	the	passage	
cited	above,	Kant	wants	to	extend	this	line	of	reasoning	to	the	practi-
cal	sphere.	He	wants	to	show	that	we	discover	the	concept	of	a	higher	
faculty	of	desire	in	the	same	way:	by	paying	attention	to	the	necessity	
of	moral	laws,	the	way	they	exclude	sensible	incentives	from	entering	
into	our	maxims.23	(Although	Kant	does	not	speak	in	this	way,	we	may	
say	moral	laws	express	deliberative necessity.)
Unfortunately,	what	Kant	says	after	he	introduces	the	Fact	of	Reason	
at	KpV,	AA	5:31	is	quite	obscure.	“Our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	
may	be	called	a	Fact	of	Reason”,	he	writes,	“because	one	cannot	reason	
it	out	from	antecedent	data	of	reason,	for	example,	from	consciousness	
of	freedom	(since	this	is	not	antecedently	given	to	us)	and	because	it	
instead	forces	itself	upon	us	of	itself	as	a	synthetic	a	priori	proposition	
and	this	must	be	proven	in	the	same	way	we	proved	the	representations	of	
space	and	time	as	a priori representations,	only	with	the	difference	that	the	
latter	concern	intuitions	but	the	former	mere	concepts	of	reason”	(Refl	7201).	
For	helpful	discussion,	see	Allison	(Kant’s Theory of Freedom,	234–235).
23.	 I	agree	with	Guyer	(“Problems	with	Freedom”)	that	the	Fact	of	Reason	refers	
not	to	our	consciousness	of	moral	“necessitation”	(Nötigung)	—	the	constraint	
of	 the	 law	upon	our	sensibly	affected	nature	—	but	to	our	consciousness	of	
its	“necessity”	(Notwendigkeit)	—	the	authority	of	the	law	as	a	law	of	pure	prac-
tical	 reason.	This	 is	an	 important	point	of	clarification,	 for	 it	 shows	(contra 
Schopenhauer)	that	Kant	is	abiding	by	the	requirement	he	lays	down	in	the	
Groundwork:	 namely,	 that	 the	 authority	 of	 the	moral	 law	does	 not	 depend	
on	any	capacity	unique	 to	human	nature	 (GMS,	AA	4:447–448).	As	Guyer	
notes,	our	consciousness	of	moral	necessity	is	“something	that	would	be	self-
evident	for	any	rational	being,	not	just	a	human	being”,	and	on	these	grounds	
we	are	warranted	to	infer	that	the	moral	law	“must	have	a	pure	source	within	
us”	(“Problems	with	Freedom”,	192).	On	this	point	of	interpretation,	I	disagree	
with	Rauscher	(“Kant’s	Moral	Anti-Realism”),	who	equates	the	Fact	of	Reason	
with	moral	necessitation,	and	with	Grenberg	(Common Moral Experience)	and	
Schönecker	(“Kant’s	Moral	Intuitionism”),	who	limit	our	access	to	the	moral	
law	 to	 the	 feeling	 of	 respect.	 For	 further	 discussion,	 see	my	 “Accessing	 the	
Moral	Law	Through	Feeling”.
Having	this	 framework	in	view,	I	 think	we	can	bring	a	novel	per-
spective	to	Kant’s	strategy	of	justification	in	the	second	Critique.	First,	
there	 is	a	noteworthy	continuity	between	his	doctrine	of	 the	Fact	of	
Reason	and	the	argument-structure	we	have	seen	in	the	B	edition	of	
the	first	Critique	and	the	Prolegomena.	Kant	draws	attention	to	this	con-
tinuity	when	he	asks,	“But	how	is	consciousness	of	that	moral	law	pos-
sible?”	(KpV,	AA	5:30).	In	reply,	he	writes:
We	can	become	aware	of	pure	practical	 laws	 just	as	we	
are	aware	of	pure	theoretical	principles,	by	paying	atten-
tion	 to	 the	necessity	 [Notwendigkeit]	with	which	 reason	
prescribes	them	to	us	and	to	the	setting	aside	of	all	em-
pirical	conditions	to	which	reason	directs	us.	The	concept	
of	a	pure	will	springs	from	the	first,	as	consciousness	of	
a	pure	understanding	springs	from	the	latter	[Der Begriff 
eines reinen Willens entspringt aus den ersteren, wie das Be-
wutsein eines reinen Verstandes aus dem letzteren].	(KpV, AA 
5:30;	modified)22
experience.	 If	we	understand	the	Fact	of	Reason	in	terms	of	our	conscious-
ness	of	moral	necessity	(which	would	be	common	to	all	rational	beings),	then	
Schopenhauer’s	objection	loses	its	force.	See	note	23	below.
22.	A	qualification	is	in	order.	In	the	theoretical	sphere,	space	and	time	are	pure	
intuitions	“that	contain	a priori the	conditions	of	the	possibility	of	objects	as	
appearances”,	and	for	this	reason	there	is	no	need	to	establish	their	objective	
validity	(A89/B121).	By	contrast,	categories	like	substance	are	pure	concepts	
that	do	not	require	corresponding	sensory	data,	and	that	 is	why	Kant	 is	re-
sponsible	for	demonstrating	their	objective	application	(i. e.,	by	way	of	a	tran-
scendental	deduction).	Given	this	asymmetry,	the	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Rea-
son	is	closer	to	Kant’s	metaphysical	expositions	of	space	and	time	than	it	is	
to	his	transcendental	deduction	of	the	categories.	Moral	laws	do	not	require	
corresponding	empirical	motives	to	bind	the	will	of	a	rational	being,	and	for	
this	reason	they	are	“immediately	lawgiving”.	Showing	that	they	spring	from	a	
higher	faculty	of	desire	obviates	the	need	to	establish	their	objective	author-
ity.	Kant	draws	attention	to	this	parallelism	in	a	Reflexion	from	the	1780s:	“The	
critique	of	practical	reason	has	as	its	basis	the	differentiation	of	empirically	
conditioned	practical	reason	from	the	pure	and	yet	practical	reason	and	asks	
whether	there	is	such	a	thing	as	the	latter.	The	critique	cannot	have	insight	
into	this	possibility	a priori because	it	concerns	the	relation	of	a	real	ground	to	
a	consequence,	thus	something	must	be	given	which	can	arise	from	it	alone;	
and	from	reality	possibility	can	be	inferred.	The	moral	 laws	are	of	this	sort,	
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law	may	be	called	a	Faktum	of	reason”	(KpV,	AA	5:31).	So	within	the	
logic	 of	 this	 paragraph,	we	 can	 see	 that	 Kant’s	 ‘Faktum’	 carries	 the	
meaning	of	‘Tatsache’	in	the	scientific	sense,	i. e.,	of	something	real	or	
actually	the	case.	The	 ‘Faktum’	 refers	to	our	actual	consciousness	of	
the	moral	law’s	deliberative	necessity.25 
Now,	however,	we	must	ask	the	same	question	as	before:	What	
proof	do	we	have	that	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	actual?	
As	we	 saw	 in	 the	 theoretical	 sphere,	Kant	does	not	 think	we	need	
to	argue	for	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition;	we	need	only	
illustrate	it	with	examples	from	mathematics	and	natural	science.	In-
terestingly,	Kant	wants	us	to	use	this	same	strategy	in	the	practical	
sphere.	We	need	only	 illustrate	 the	 reality	 of	moral	 consciousness,	
and	we	can	do	 this,	he	 thinks,	by	 turning	 to	examples	of	 common	
moral	 judgment.	Thus,	after	 introducing	the	Fact	of	Reason	at	KpV, 
AA	5:30,	Kant	writes:	“The	Faktum	mentioned	above	is	undeniable”,	
adding:	 “One	 need	 only	 analyze	 the	 judgments	 that	 people	 [Men-
schen]	pass	on	 the	 lawfulness	of	 their	 actions	 in	order	 to	find	 that,	
whatever	inclination	may	say	to	the	contrary,	their	reason,	incorrupt-
ible	and	self-constrained,	always	holds	the	maxim	of	the	will	 in	an	
25.	 On	this	point	my	reading	is	close	to	Kleingeld’s	—	who	also	reads	‘Faktum’	as	
a	 kind	 of	 ‘Tatsache’	—	although	 there	 are	 differences	 worth	mentioning.	 In	
Kleingeld’s	view,	“the	entire	argument	[of	the	Fact	of	Reason]	can	be	cast	in	
(presumably	‘non-moral’)	terms	of	a	theory	of	action	and	be	regarded	as	the	
articulation	of	 the	self-understanding	of	agents	who	take	 themselves	 to	be	
reasoning	about	which	maxims	to	adopt	and	why”	(“Moral	Consciousness”,	
70).	She	first	supports	this	reading	with	Kant’s	remark	that	we	need	only	ana-
lyze	“the	judgments	people	pass	on	the	lawfulness	of	their	actions”	to	confirm	
the	Fact	of	Reason	(KpV,	AA	5:32).	As	I	see	things,	however,	it	is	debatable	
whether	Kant	meant	 “lawfulness”	here	 in	non-moral	 terms.	Kleingeld	 then	
maintains	 that	 the	 Fact	 of	 Reason	 refers	 to	 our	 consciousness	 of	 “the	 fun-
damental	law	of	pure	practical	reason”,	a	law	that	is	“subsequently	called	the	
moral	law”	(“Moral	Consciousness”,	66;	my	emphasis).	However,	in	section	
6	—	before	Kant	introduces	the	“fundamental	law”	—	he	writes:	“It	is	therefore	
the	moral law […]	that	first offers	itself	to	us	and	[…]	leads	directly	to	the	con-
cept	of	freedom”	(KpV,	AA	5:29).	Given	these	discrepancies,	I	share	Ameriks’s	
doubts	 (“Practical	 Justification”)	 regarding	 the	prospect	of	 reconstructing	a	
“non-moral	route”	in	the	second	Critique.	See	note	26	below.
that	is	not	based	on	any	intuition,	either	pure	or	empirical”	(KpV, AA 
5:31).	This	remark	has	led	many	commentators	to	conclude	that	Kant	
is	slipping	into	a	kind	of	dogmatism	in	the	second	Critique	—	resorting	
to	 “foot-stomping”	and	 “moralistic	bluster”	—	and	 it	 certainly	 sounds	
as	if	he	is	asserting	our	moral	consciousness	as	a	brute	fact.	After	all,	
what	else	could	it	mean	to	say	our	moral	consciousness	“forces	itself	
upon	us”,	if	not	that	we	have	direct,	intuitive	insight	to	the	truth	of	the	
moral	law?	Despite	these	worries,	what	Kant	says	before	this	passage	
is	more	helpful,	in	my	view,	and	points	the	way	to	a	more	charitable	
reading	of	the	text.24
Kant	asks	us	to	compare	moral	laws	to	the	rules	we	find	in	pure	
geometry	 (KpV,	 AA	 5:31).	 The	 latter,	 he	 says,	 “contain	 nothing	 fur-
ther	than	the	presupposition	that	one	could	do	something	if	 it	were	
required	that	one	should	do	it”.	By	contrast,	moral	laws	say	that	“one	
ought	absolutely	 to	proceed	in	a	certain	way”	(KpV,	AA	5:31).	 (This	
is	the	deliberative	necessity	I	just	spoke	of.)	As	we	read	further,	it	is	
clear	 that	Kant	 also	wants	 to	highlight	 the	 status	of	our	moral	 con-
sciousness	 itself.	We	are,	he	explains,	actually	conscious	that	moral	
laws	provide	us	with	immediate	determining	grounds	of	choice,	and	
for	that	reason	we	do	not	need	to	ask	whether	our	moral	conscious-
ness	is	possible.	Not	surprisingly,	then,	right	after	Kant	says	it	is	“not	
impossible”	to	think	of	practical	laws	that	direct	the	will	immediately,	
he	employs	the	language	of	fact:	“Consciousness	of	this	fundamental	
24.	Commentators	have	also	been	troubled	by	Kant’s	remark	that	the	moral	law	
“cannot	be	proved	by	any	deduction”	although	it	is	“firmly	established	of	itself”	
(KpV,	AA	5:46;	cf.	MS,	AA	6:225	where	Kant	says	moral	laws	are	“incapable of 
being proved	and	yet	apodictic”).	In	Hegel’s	memorable	phrase,	the	moral	law	
seems	to	be	the	“final	undigested	lump	left	within	the	stomach,	the	revelation	
given	to	reason”	(quoted	in	Allison,	Freedom,	281).	However,	it	 is	important	
to	keep	 in	mind	what	Kant	means	by	a	 “deduction”.	As	he	explains	 in	 the	
subsequent	paragraph,	concepts	of	pure	understanding	or	categories	admit	
of	a	deduction	(i. e.,	a	 justification	of	 their	objective	and	universal	validity),	
because	they	refer	to	objects	of	possible	experience.	We	can	in	turn	show	that	
they	are	cognizable	only	by	virtue	of	these	very	categories.	No	such	deduc-
tion	of	the	moral	law	is	forthcoming,	since	no	exact	observation	of	it	can	be	
found	in	experience	(KpV,	AA	5:46–47).	Kant	makes	a	similar	claim	at	the	end	
of	Groundwork	III	(see	GMS,	AA	4:463).
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If	we	 now	 read	 this	 passage	 in	 light	 of	KpV,	 AA	 5:30,	 a	 clear	 pic-
ture	of	what	motivates	Kant’s	doctrine	of	 the	Fact	of	Reason	 takes	
shape.	A	law	that	commands	“completely	a	priori	and	independent	
of	any	sensible	data”	is	logically	coherent.	Yet	that	does	not	give	us	
the	conclusion	Kant	is	seeking:	that	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	(as	
opposed	to	an	empirical)	faculty	of	desire.	We	are	first	required	to	
show	that	we	are	actually conscious of	this	law	as	a	ground	of	choice	
before	we	can	infer	the	condition	of	its	possibility.	And	that	is	why	
the	judgments	of	common	reason	are	essential	for	Kant’s	strategy	of	
justification.	 Just	 as	 examples	 from	mathematics	 and	 science	 con-
firm	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition,	judgments	from	ordi-
nary	people	confirm	the	reality	of	moral	consciousness.	Both provide 
us with grounds to infer the existence of a pure faculty within us, whether 
of cognition or of desire.
4. Kant’s Thought Experiments
4.1. An Advantage Like a Chemist
At	 this	point	 it	may	be	 tempting	 to	 read	Kant’s	 claim	 from KpV, AA 
5:32	—	that	“one	need	only	analyze	the	judgments	people	pass	on	the	
lawfulness	of	their	maxims”	—	as	an	appeal	to	empirical	evidence.27	It	
is	of	course	true	that	(most)	human	beings	engage	in	moral	behavior,	
is	something	actual	—	a	“fact”	—	which	in	turn	warrants	the	assumption	that	
our	faculty	of	desire	is	also	pure	(and	not	merely	affected	by	sensible	incen-
tives)	(KpV,	AA	5:31).	As	a	reviewer	for	this	journal	helped	me	to	see,	one	may	
still	wonder:	How	should	we	view	the	relationship	between	(a)	the	authority	
of	the	moral	law	and	(b)	the	existence	of	a	pure	faculty	within	us?	My	reply,	
briefly	put,	is	that	Kant	is	not	offering	an	argumentative	route	to	the	moral	
law’s	authority;	rather,	he	is	starting	with	our	consciousness	of	this	authority	
as	a	“Tatsache”.	The	point	I	have	wanted	to	stress	 in	this	paper,	however,	 is	
that	while	the	moral	law	admits	of	no	deduction,	Kant	nevertheless	deploys	
experiments	in	the	second	Critique	that	serve	to	produce	our	consciousness	of	
moral	necessity.
27.	Moyar	 (“Unstable	 Autonomy”,	 333)	 and	 Grenberg	 (Common Moral Experi-
ence,	151)	have	—	correctly,	I	believe	—	found	Proops	guilty	of	this	reading.	In	
Proops’s	view,	“what	would	reveal	the	non-empirical	origin	of	the	idea	of	duty	
would	be	its	constancy	across	persons	whose	quality	and	level	of	moral	edu-
cation	differed	widely”	(“Kant’s	Legal	Metaphor”,	226).
action	up	to	the	pure	will,	that	is,	to	itself	inasmuch	as	it	regards	itself	
as	a	priori	practical”	(KpV,	AA	5:32).
Later	 in	 the	 second	Critique	Kant	explains	why	 the	 judgments	of	
“common reason”	have	a	justificatory	role	to	play	in	this	context	(KpV, 
AA	5:91).	He	observes	that	in	the	theoretical	sphere	it	was	“easily	and	
evidently	proved”	that	we	possess	a	pure	faculty	of	cognition,	since	we	
have	“examples	from	the	sciences”	ready	at	hand.	Such	sciences	“put	
their	principles	to	the	test	in	so	many	ways	by	methodic	use”,	so	we	
need	not	fear	what	Kant	calls	“a	secret	mixture	of	empirical	grounds”	
underlying	them	(KpV,	AA	5:91).	Turning	now	to	the	practical	sphere,	
he	writes:
But	 that	pure	 reason,	without	 the	admixture	of	any	em-
pirical	determining	ground,	is	practical	of	itself	alone:	this	
one	had	to	be	able	to	show	from	the	most common practical 
use of reason, by	confirming	the	supreme	practical	princi-
ple	as	one	that	every	natural	human	reason	cognizes	—	a	
law	completely	a	priori	and	independent	of	any	sensible	
data	—	as	the	supreme	law	of	its	will.	It	was	necessary	first	
to	establish	and	justify	the	purity	of	its	origin	even	in the 
judgment of this common reason before	science	would	take	
it	in	hand	in	order	to	make	use	of	it,	so	to	speak,	as	a	Fak-
tum	that	precedes	all	subtle	reasoning	about	its	possibility	
and	all	the	consequences	that	may	be	drawn	from	it.	(KpV, 
AA	5:91)26
26.	Citing	 this	passage,	Rawls	also	highlights	 the	 importance	of	 common	mor-
al	 judgment	 for	 interpreting	Kant’s	doctrine	of	 the	Fact	of	Reason.	On	 this	
point	I	am	indebted	to	his	approach.	However,	I	am	not	committed	to	Rawls’s	
further	claim	that	by	the	time	of	the	second	Critique	Kant	had	developed	“a	
constructivist	conception	of	practical	reason”	(Lectures on the History of Moral 
Philosophy,	268).	As	Kain	points	out	(“Realism	and	Anti-Realism”,	“Practical	
Cognition,	 Intuition,	 and	 the	 Fact	 of	 Reason”),	 there	 are	 difficulties	 facing	
constructivist	readings	of	Kant’s	ethics.	Setting	these	difficulties	aside,	I	am	
also	not	sure	how	Rawls	thinks	the	Fact	of	Reason	justifies	(or	“authenticates”,	
as	he	prefers	to	say)	the	moral	law.	As	I	understand	the	structure	of	Chapter	I,	
Kant	begins	with	a	conceptual	argument	for	why	there	can	only	be	one	fun-
damental	law	of	pure	practical	reason,	the	“moral	law”	(KpV,	AA	5:30).	Then,	
after	this	conceptual	argument,	Kant	claims	that	our	consciousness	of	this	law	
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in	 the	 place	 of	 an	 honest	man)	 is	 confronted	with	 the	
moral	 law	 in	which	he	 cognizes	 the	worthlessness	of	 a	
liar,	his	practical	reason	(in	its	judgment	of	what	he	ought	
to	do)	at	once	abandons	the	advantage,	unites	with	what	
maintains	 in	 him	 respect	 for	 his	 own	 person	 (truthful-
ness),	and	the	advantage,	after	it	has	been	separated	and	
washed	from	every	particle	of	reason	(which	is	altogether	
on	the	side	of	duty),	is	weighed	by	everyone,	so	that	it	can	
enter	into	combination	with	reason	in	other	cases.	(KpV, 
AA	5:92–93)29
While	they	are	difficult	to	see	at	first,	thought	experiments	of	this	sort	
run	throughout	the	second	Critique.30	One	that	deserves	special	atten-
tion	occurs	at	KpV,	AA	5:30,	only	paragraphs	before	Kant	first	speaks	
of	the	Fact	of	Reason.	In	this	section	of	the	text	Kant	has	argued	that	
we	only	 become	 aware	of	 our	 freedom	 through	 the	moral	 law,	 and	
to	prove	this	he	introduces	a	character	who	reports	to	have	a	lustful	
inclination	he	cannot	control	(KpV,	AA	5:30).	In	what	follows	Kant	ar-
ranges	for	us	a	narrative	with	two	scenes.	In	the	first	scene,	the	lustful	
man	is	asked	what	he	would	do	if,	upon	satisfying	his	inclination,	he	
were	immediately	strung	up	on	a	gallows:
29.	See	 also	 Rohden,	 “An	 Experiment	 with	 Practical	 Reason”,	 esp.	 103;	 Keller,	
“Two	Conceptions	of	Compatibilism”,	esp.	124,	and	Timmermann,	“Reversal	
or	Retreat?”,	esp.	88,	note	29.
30.	For	example,	 at	KpV,	AA	5:25,	Kant	writes:	 “Suppose	 that	an	acquaintance	
whom	you	otherwise	liked	tried	to	justify	to	you	his	having	given	false	testi-
mony	by	first	pleading	what	he	asserts	to	be	the	sacred	duty	of	his	own	happi-
ness	[…]	Or	suppose	that	someone	recommends	to	you	as	steward	a	man	to	
whom	you	could	blindly	trust	all	your	affairs	and,	in	order	to	inspire	you	with	
confidence,	extols	him	as	a	prudent	human	being	with	masterly	understand-
ing	of	his	own	advantage”.	In	the	first	case,	Kant	says,	“you	would	either	laugh	
in	his	face	or	shrink	back	from	him	with	disgust”	(KpV,	AA	5:26).	In	the	sec-
ond	case,	“you	would	believe	either	that	the	recommender	was	making	a	fool	
of	you	or	that	he	had	lost	his	mind”	(KpV,	AA	5:26).	Thus,	Kant	concludes:	“So	
distinctly	and	sharply	drawn	are	the	boundaries	of	morality	and	self-love	that	
even	the	most	common	eye	cannot	fail	to	distinguish	whether	something	be-
longs	to	the	one	or	the	other”	(KpV,	AA	5:26).	For	similar	examples,	see	KpV, 
AA	5:37,	and	5:88–89.
if	only	by	judging	their	actions	“good”	or	“bad”.	But	I	believe	it	would	
be	a	mistake	to	read	Kant’s	strategy	in	this	way.	Kant	does	not	want	us	
to	observe	the	standpoint	of	common	reason	from	a	theoretical,	third-
personal	perspective.	Rather,	he	wants	us	to	take	up	this	standpoint	
ourselves,	so	that	we	can	illustrate	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	
from	a	practical,	first-personal perspective.
Kant	calls	attention	to	this	perspective	later	in	the	second	Critique 
(KpV,	AA	5:92).	In	a	gesture	at	once	odd	and	intriguing,	he	claims	that	
a	philosopher	has	an	advantage	“like	a	chemist”	in	that	he	can	set	up	
experiments	with	 every	 ordinary	 person.	As	he	 puts	 it,	 the	 philoso-
pher	can	“distinguish	the	moral	(pure)	determining	ground	from	the	
empirical,	namely,	by	adding	the	moral	law	(as	a	determining	ground)	
to	the	empirically	affected	will	(e. g.,	that	of	someone	who	would	glad-
ly	lie	because	he	can	gain	something	by	it)”	(KpV,	AA	5:92).28	To	make	
the	metaphor	vivid,	Kant	compares	the	philosopher’s	experiment	to	a	
process	of	adding	alkali	to	hydrochloric	acid:
When	an	analyst	adds	alkali	 to	a	solution	of	calcareous	
earth	in	hydrochloric	acid,	 the	acid	at	once	releases	the	
lime	and	unites	with	the	alkali,	and	the	lime	is	precipitat-
ed.	In	just	the	same	way,	if	a	man	who	is	otherwise	hon-
est	 (or	who	 just	 this	once	puts	himself	only	 in	 thought	
28.	Returning	now	to	the	obscure	passage	from	KpV,	AA	5:31,	we	can	see	that,	
far	from	resorting	to	a	dogmatic	position,	Kant	is	merely	stating	that	our	con-
sciousness	of	 the	moral	 law	 is	not	 accessible	outside	 a	normatively	 “thick”	
practical	perspective.	For	obvious	reasons,	it	is	not	accessible	from	a	specu-
lative	point	of	view,	because	speculative	reason	only	 teaches	us	 the	 law	of	
causal	mechanism,	the	antithesis	of	freedom.	For	less	obvious	reasons,	Kant’s	
point	is	that	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	not	accessible	from	a	“thin”	
practical	perspective.	For	when	we	examine	the	capacities	anyone	must	pos-
sess	to	function	as	a	rational	agent	(e. g.,	a	capacity	to	step	back	and	reflect	on	
one’s	desires),	there	is	nothing	internal	to	these	capacities	that	would	bind	
one	 to	 a	 law	 other	 than	 one’s	 own	happiness.	 That	 is	why	—	as	Kant	 says	
elsewhere	—	the	“most	rational	being	of	the	world”	might	be	oblivious	to	the	
moral	law	and	so	“might	still	need	some	incentives,	coming	to	him	from	the	
objects	of	the	inclinations,	in	order	to	determine	his	power	of	choice”	(RGV, 
AA	6:27n).	In	light	of	these	considerations,	I	find	it	difficult	to	associate	Kant’s	
mature	ethics	with	recent	constitutivist	arguments	for	moral	normativity.
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reflects	on	his	duty,	we	 see	 that	he	must	 reach	an	entirely	different	
verdict:	namely,	that	he	would	be	worthless	as	a	liar,	and	that	refusing	
the	prince	is	the	only	choice	that	would	maintain	his	self-respect.	He	
would	thus	abandon	whatever	advantage	he	sees	in	the	lie	(as	the	acid	
“at	once	releases	the	lime”)	and	acknowledge	the	authority	of	the	moral	
law	(as	the	acid	“unites	with	the	alkali”).32
In	 working	 through	 the	 second	 scene,	 we	 stand	 to	 witness	 the	
man’s	inner	transformation,	whereby	he	comes	to	deliberate	without	
giving	priority	 to	 his	 own	happiness,	 and	 so	without	 letting	 empiri-
cal	motives	 enter	 into	his	maxims.	 In	 judging	what	 he	 ought	 to	 do,	
the	man	is	conscious	of	a	law	“completely	a	priori	and	independent	of	
any	sensible	data”,	and	he	is	conscious	of	it,	moreover,	as	an	immedi-
ate	ground	of	choice.	In	my	understanding,	the	aim	of	Kant’s	thought	
experiment	is	to	elicit	this	fact	from	the	reader,	so	that	he	or	she	may	
see	how	people	separate	duty	from	self-interest	as	if	the	two	were	un-
mixable	chemical	compounds.	In	this	respect,	when	we	work	through	
the	 steps	 of	 the	 experiment,	 we	 take	 up	 a	 deliberative	 perspective	
available	to	all	rational	beings.33	And	that	is	why	Kant	thinks	we	have	
grounds	to	treat	moral	consciousness	“as	a	fact	that	precedes	all	subtle	
reasoning	about	its	possibility”	(KpV,	AA	5:91),	deciding	that	it	must	
spring	from	a	pure	faculty	within	us.	Beyond	this,	we	do	not	need	a	
32.	 The	experiment	would	still	work	even	if	the	man	decided	he	would	give	in	
to	 the	prince’s	demand,	 for	he	would	not	 thereby	claim	his	maxim	should	
become	a	universal	law.	As	Kant	makes	clear	in	the	Groundwork,	in	any	trans-
gression	of	duty	“we	find	that	we	do	not	really	will	that	our	maxim	should	
become	a	universal	law,	since	that	is	impossible	for	us,	but	that	the	opposite	
of	our	maxim	should	instead	remain	a	universal	law	[e. g.,	refusing	the	prince],	
only	we	take	the	liberty	of	making	an	exception to	it	for	ourselves	(or	just	for	
this	once)	to	the	advantage	of	our	inclination”	(GMS,	AA	4:424).
33.	 For	this	reason	my	account	avoids	an	objection	Moyar	has	brought	against	
first-personal	readings	of	the	second	Critique.	In	Moyar’s	view,	these	readings	
establish	the	reality	of	freedom	only	“for the reader	who	successfully	takes	up	
and	is	moved	by	the	examples	considered	in	the	text.”	Yet	as	he	points	out:	
“Kant	surely	meant	for	the	deduction	to	establish	the	reality	of	freedom	from	
the	practical	point	of	view,	not	just	from	my	practical	point	of	view”	(“Unsta-
ble	Autonomy”,	334).	On	my	interpretation,	Kant’s	thought	experiments	serve	
to	illustrate	a	fact	for	all	rational	agents,	not	just	for	human	agents	—	and	cer-
tainly	not	just	for	readers	of	the	second	Critique.	See	note	23	above.
Suppose	 someone	 asserts	 of	 his	 lustful	 inclination	 that,	
when	the	desired	object	and	the	opportunity	are	present,	
it	 is	 quite	 irresistible	 to	 him;	 ask	 him	whether,	 if	 a	 gal-
lows	were	erected	 in	 front	of	 the	house	where	he	finds	
this	opportunity	and	he	would	be	hanged	on	it	 immedi-
ately	after	gratifying	his	 lust,	he	would	not	then	control	
his	inclination.	One	need	not	conjecture	very	long	what	
he	would	reply.	(KpV,	AA	5:30)31
In	the	second	scene	the	man	is	asked	what	he	would	do	if,	threatened	
by	the	same	execution,	a	prince	demanded	him	to	bear	false	witness	
against	an	innocent	person:
But	ask	him	whether,	if	his	prince	demanded,	on	pain	of	
the	same	immediate	execution,	that	he	give	false	testimo-
ny	against	an	honorable	man	whom	the	prince	would	like	
to	destroy	under	a	plausible	pretext,	he	would	consider	it	
possible	to	overcome	his	love	of	life,	however	great	it	may	
be.	He	would	perhaps	not	venture	to	assert	whether	he	
would	do	it	or	not,	but	he	must	admit	without	hesitation	
that	it	would	be	possible	for	him.	(KpV,	AA	5:30)
In	the	second	scene	we	are	considering	what	the	man	would	do	if	he	
took	up	a	moral	point	of	view.	We	are	—	to	speak	in	terms	of	the	chem-
istry	metaphor	—	adding	a	pure	determining	ground	(“the	alkali”)	 to	
the	man’s	empirically	affected	will	(“a	solution	of	calcareous	earth	in	
hydrochloric	acid”)	in	order	to	see what	must	result.	Prior	to	this	de-
termining	ground	it	is	likely	the	man	would	lie,	since	he	would	have	
something	very	important	to	gain	from	it:	his	own	life.	But	now,	if	he	
31.	 We	must	 still	 assume	 the	 lustful	man	 is	 sensitive	 to	 considerations	of	 pru-
dence.	It	is	not	difficult	for	us	to	imagine	characters	who,	in	the	grips	of	pas-
sion,	are	“in	no	mood	to	listen	to	reason”	—	as	de	Sade	describes	the	villains	
who	tell	Justine	that	“even	if	there	had	been	a	gallows	on	the	spot,	[she]	shall	
still	be	their	prey”	(Misfortunes of Virtue,	27).	In	Kant’s	example,	we	need	not	
conjecture	very	long	what	the	lustful	man	will	say,	assuming	that	he	is	(unlike	
de	Sade’s	villains)	listening	to	reason.
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is	offered	gain,	that	is,	great	gifts	or	high	rank;	he	rejects	
them.	This	will	produce	mere	approval	and	applause	in	
the	listener’s	soul,	because	it	is	gain.	Now	threats	of	loss	
begin.	 Among	 these	 calumniators	 are	 his	 best	 friends,	
who	now	refuse	him	their	friendship;	close	relatives,	who	
threaten	to	disinherit	him	(he	is	not	wealthy);	powerful	
people,	who	can	pursue	and	hurt	him	 in	all	places	and	
circumstances;	a	prince	who	 threatens	him	with	 loss	of	
freedom	and	even	of	life	itself.	But,	so	that	the	measure	
of	suffering	may	be	full	and	he	may	also	feel	the	pain	that	
only	a	morally	good	heart	can	feel	very	deeply,	represent	
his	family	[…]	as	imploring him to yield and	himself,	though	
upright,	yet	with	a	heart	not	hard	or	insensible	either	to	
compassion	or	to	his	own	distress;	represent	him	at	a	mo-
ment	when	he	wishes	that	he	had	never	lived	to	see	the	
day	 that	 exposed	him	 to	 such	unutterable	pain	and	yet	
remains	firm	in	his	resolution	to	be	truthful,	without	wa-
vering	or	even	doubting.	(KpV,	AA	5:156)
At	this	point,	Kant	concludes,
my	young	listener	will	be	raised	step	by	step	from	mere	
approval	 to	admiration,	 from	that	to	amazement,	and	fi-
nally	to	the	greatest	veneration	and	a	lively	wish	that	he	
himself	could	be	such	a	man	(though	certainly	not	in	such	
circumstances);	and	yet	virtue	is	here	worth	so	much	only	
because	it	costs	so	much,	not	because	it	brings	any	profit.	
(KpV,	AA	5:156;	cf.	GMS,	AA	4:411n)
From	what	Kant	portrays	here,	 it	 is	clear	 that	we	can	engage	with	a	
story	like	this	on	both	cognitive	and	affective	levels.	As	the	story	pro-
gresses,	the	young	listener	is	led	to	cultivate	his	judgment,	eventually	
distinguishing	in	the	honest	man’s	resolution	nothing	but	pure	duty,	
separated	from	any	motive	that	would	implore	him,	like	his	family,	to	
long,	complex	strategy	of	proof.	The	Tatsache	of	moral	consciousness	
shows	that	reason	can	be	practical	of	itself,	and	“all	subtle	reasoning	
against	the	possibility	of	its	being	practical	is	futile”	(KpV,	AA	5:3).
4.2. Spectator and Experiment
Before	moving	 forward,	 there	 is	 an	apparent	 inconsistency	 I	 should	
address.	Why	does	Kant	treat	the	reader	as	a	spectator in	the	experi-
ment	from	KpV,	AA	5:30?	Does	this	mean	he	is	not	trying	to	elicit	our	
consciousness	 of	 the	 moral	 law	 from	 a	 practical,	 first-personal	 per-
spective?	We	could	see	this	perspective	in	the	first	Critique	when	Kant	
asked	us	to	remove	from	a	body	“everything	that	is	empirical	in	it	—	the	
color,	the	hardness	or	softness,	the	weight,	even	the	impenetrability”,	
as	a	way	of	illustrating	the	necessity	of	space,	which	experience	can-
not	teach	us.	My	contention	is	that	Kant	is	using	this	same	strategy	in	
the	second	Critique;	the	only	difference	is	that	he	wants	us	to	apply	it	
to	another	person’s	point	of	view.	When	we	imagine	a	man	faced	with	
threats	of	execution,	for	example,	we	cannot	detect	any	empirical	mo-
tive	that	would	secretly	press	upon	him	to	refuse	the	prince.	So	the	
moment	he	judges	that	truthfulness	is	the	only	act	that	“maintains	in	
him	respect	for	his	own	person”,	we	must	conclude	that	he	is	deferring	
authority	to	a	principle	other	than	his	own	happiness.	In	this	way	the	
experiment	has	a	participatory	element,	despite	the	fact	 that	 it	does	
not	bring	us	(the	readers)	into	the	narrative	scene.
This	 participatory	 element	 is	 central	 to	 Part	 II	 of	 the	 second	Cri-
tique,	 titled	 ‘Doctrine	of	 the	Method	of	Pure	Practical	Reason’.	Here	
Kant	argues	that	the	moral	law	must	have	a	more	powerful	effect	on	
us	 the	more	 it	 is	 isolated	 from	 incentives	 that	would	 link	 it	 (if	only	
covertly)	to	self-interest.	To	establish	this	controversial	thesis,	he	asks	
us	to	imagine	telling	the	following	story	to	a	youth	around	ten	years	of	
age.	The	story	centers	on	an	honest	man	“whom	someone	wants	to	in-
duce	to	join	the	calumniators	of	an	innocent	but	otherwise	powerless	
person	(say,	Anne	Boleyn,	accused	by	Henry	VIII	of	England)”	(KpV, 
AA	5:156).	This	man,	Kant	explains,
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by	Henrich	and	Proops,	that	Kant’s	Faktum	is	best	understood	under	a	
legal	analogy.	A	final	objection	is	(c)	that	my	interpretation	fails	to	vin-
dicate	Kant’s	doctrine	against	a	skeptic	who	denies	our	consciousness	
of	the	moral	law	is	a	genuine	fact.	Let	me	address	each	in	turn.
5.1. First Objection: “Matters of Fact” in the Third Critique
First,	 the	one	and	only	place	where	Kant	speaks	of	a	Tatsache	of	rea-
son	—	in	§91	of	the	third	Critique	—	he	does	not	refer	to	our	conscious-
ness	of	moral	necessity.	He	defines	matters	of	 fact	as	objects	of	con-
cepts	 the	 “reality	 of	 which	 can	 be	 proved”,	 adding	 parenthetically:	
“whether	through	pure	reason	or	through	experience,	and	whether	in	
the	first	case	through	theoretical	or	practical	data	of	reason”	(KU, AA 
5:648).	What	is	surprising,	given	our	previous	discussion,	is	that	Kant	
goes	on	to	list	“freedom”	as	the	only	idea	we	can	list	among	the	facts:
But	what	 is	quite	 remarkable,	 there	 is	even	one	 idea	of	
reason	 (which	 is	 in	 itself	 incapable	of	 any	presentation	
in	 intuition,	 thus	 incapable	 of	 theoretical	 proof	 of	 its	
possibility)	among	matters	of	fact,	and	that	is	the	idea	of	
freedom.	The	reality	[of	this	idea]	as	a	particular	kind	of	
causality	—	the	concept	of	which	would	be	excessive	from	
a	theoretical	point	of	view	—	can	be	established	through	
practical	 laws	 of	 pure	 reason,	 and,	 in	 accordance	 with	
these,	in	actual	deeds,	and	thus	in	experience.	—	It	is	the	
only	one	among	all	the	ideas	of	pure	reason	whose	object	
is	a	matter	of	fact.	(KU,	AA	5:648;	modified)
If	we	take	this	passage	to	represent	Kant’s	official	position,	it	appears	
we	only	have	 textual	grounds	 to	speak	of	a	 “fact	of	 freedom”,	not	a	
“fact	of	moral	consciousness”,	as	I	have	proposed.	There	is,	however,	a	
larger	interpretive	difficulty	at	stake	here,	for	even	within	the	second	
Critique	we	find	Kant	offering	conflicting	characterizations	of	the	Fact	
of	Reason.	While	 it	 is	usually	 clear	 that	Kant’s	Faktum	 refers	 to	our	
consciousness	of	the	moral	law,	at	one	point	he	speaks	of	it	in	terms	
yield	to	the	evil	calumniators.	At	the	same	time,	the	boy	is	led	to	culti-
vate	his	sensibility,	first	by	admiring	the	honest	man’s	courage,	and	fi-
nally	by	expressing	the	deepest	respect	for	his	actions.34	As	these	cog-
nitive	and	affective	responses	reach	their	peak,	the	dialectic	between	
spectator	and	experiment	turns	inward.	For	in	the	final	stage	we	have	
the	boy	expressing	“a	lively	wish	that	he himself	could	be	such	a	man”	
(my	emphasis),	moved	by	 the	 awareness	of	his	own	capacity	 to	 act	
from	pure	motives.	All	of	this	suggests	that	Kant’s	method	for	eliciting	
our	actual	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	not	only	of	philosophical	
value,	i. e.,	for	showing	that	pure	reason	is	practical.	When	it	enters	the	
mind	of	a	pupil	by	way	of	examples,	the	philosopher’s	experiment	is	
also	a	method	of	moral	education.35
5. Objections and Replies
So	far	I	have	argued	that	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	is	a	fact 
because	it	is	something	actual,	and	it	is	a	fact	of	reason	because	—	upon	
reflection	—	we	see	that	it	must	spring	from	a	higher	faculty	of	desire.	
On	 the	 reading	 I	 have	 offered,	 Kant	 is	 not	 treating	 our	 moral	 con-
sciousness	dogmatically,	i.e.,	as	a	brute	given.	Rather,	he	is	treating	it	
as	something	actual,	a	matter	of	fact,	and	what	is	more,	he	is	setting	up	
thought	experiments	that	generate	this	fact	within	the	reader.	These	
points	become	clear	as	soon	as	we	read	Kant’s	doctrine	through	the	
notion	of	a	Tatsache	 that	had	acquired	a	meaning	so	flexible	 in	Ger-
many	—	thanks	to	Spalding	—	that	it	was	adopted	primarily	by	theolo-
gians	during	the	1770s	and	1780s.	There	are,	however,	a	few	objections	
that	one	could	raise	against	my	interpretation	in	this	paper.	As	I	antici-
pate	them,	one	could	argue	(a)	that	my	interpretation	is	inconsistent	
with	Kant’s	usage	of	 ‘matters	of	 fact’	 from	the	Critique of the Power of 
Judgment	(1790);	and	(b)	that	it	lies	in	tension	with	a	claim,	defended	
34.	 See	also	KpV,	AA	5:158–159	for	the	example	of	Phalaris’s	bull.
35.	 See	 also	MS,	 AA	 6:483.	Most	 commentators	 overlook	 the	 connections	 be-
tween	Kant’s	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	Reason	and	his	theory	of	moral	education	
from	Part	 II	of	 the	second	Critique.	For	exceptions	to	this	 trend,	see	Budick	
(Kant and Milton,	esp.	Ch.	5),	Guyer	(“Examples	of	Moral	Possibility”,	esp.	134,	
137),	and	Grenberg	(Common Moral Experience,	esp.	Ch.	9).
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consistent	with	Kant’s	overall	position	to	locate	moral	consciousness	
among	the	facts,	as	I	have	done.37
5.2. Second Objection: Henrich and Proops on the Legal Analogy
In	a	highly	influential	essay,	Dieter	Henrich	has	argued	that	the	“entire	
first	Critique,	and	the	way	in	which	Kant	presents	its	theory	as	a	whole,	
was	thoroughly	affected	by	the	decision	to	adopt	juridical	procedures	
as	a	methodological	paradigm”	(“Kant’s	Deduction”,	38).	More	recently,	
Ian	Proops	has	extended	Henrich’s	claim	to	argue	that	the	legal	anal-
ogy,	more	 so	 than	 anything	 else,	 penetrates	 the	 air	 of	mystery	 sur-
rounding	Kant’s	Faktum.	On	the	basis	of	published	and	unpublished	
texts,	Proops	builds	what	appears	to	be	a	strong	case	for	reading	Kant’s	
Faktum	in	terms	of	the	quid facti/quid juris	distinction	criminal	lawyers	
used	during	the	eighteenth	century.	What	emerges	from	this	distinc-
tion,	he	argues,	is	the	meaning	of	a	factum	as	something	that	remains	
“relevant	to,	but	falls	short	of,	a	final	ruling”	(“Kant’s	Legal	Metaphor”,	
215).	To	support	his	reading,	Proops	cites	various	places	in	the	second	
Critique	where	Kant	appeals	to	the	judgments	of	common	human	rea-
son,	adding:	“[O]ne	doubts	that	these	‘proofs’	of	the	purity	of	origin	of	
the	moral	law	can	be	conclusive,	but	it	is	plain	that	Kant	believes	they	
ought	to	have	some	probative	force	—	in	the	way,	perhaps,	that	legal	
evidence	 has	 defeasible, non-demonstrative	 force”	 (“Kant’s	 Legal	Meta-
phor”,	227;	my	emphasis).38
Now	 it	 is	 no	doubt	 true	 that	Kant	was	deeply	 influenced	by	 the	
juridical	procedures	of	his	day,	and	I	 think	 it	 is	useful	 to	emphasize	
37.	 In	a	footnote	Kant	also	explains	that	he	is	going	beyond	the	usual	meaning	
of	a	Tatsache.	As	he	writes:	“Here	I	extend	the	concept	of	a	matter	of	fact,	as	
seems	 to	me	 right,	 beyond	 the	usual	meaning	of	 this	word.	 For	when	 the	
issue	is	the	relation	of	things	to	our	cognitive	capacities	it	is	not	necessary,	in-
deed	not	even	feasible,	to	restrict	this	expression	merely	to	actual	experience”	
(KU,	AA	5:468n;	modified).
38.	Proops	continues:	 “[W]hat	 really	matters,	 for	present	purposes,	 is	 the	very	
fact	that	Kant	envisages	such	proofs	at	all.	That	he	does	so	supports	a	view	of	
the	Fact	of	Reason	as	the	factum	of	the	Deduction	of	Freedom;	for	as	we	have	
seen,	a	factum	is	a	fact	that needs to be proved in the course of a deduction”	(“Kant’s	
Legal	Metaphor”,	227;	my	emphasis).
of	our	consciousness	of	freedom,	writing:	“this	fact	is	inseparably	con-
nected	with,	and	indeed	identical	with,	consciousness	of	freedom	of	
the	will”	(KpV,	AA	5:42).
While	a	 full	 treatment	of	 this	 topic	 lies	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	
analysis,	I	believe	a	solution	is	fairly	easy	to	sketch.	All	we	have	to	do	is	
coordinate	two	of	Kant’s	well-known	claims	in	the	second	Critique:	the	
reciprocity	thesis	and	the	disclosure	thesis.36	According	to	the	former,	
freedom	and	morality	are	analytically linked,	because	when	we	exam-
ine	one	concept	we	are	led	directly	to	the	other,	and	vice versa (KpV, 
AA	5:29).	According	to	the	latter,	it	is	only	through	our	consciousness	
of	 the	 moral	 law	—	as	 a	 law	 that	 commands	 without	 empirical	 mo-
tives	—	that	we	acquire	a	positive	 idea	of	our	 freedom.	As	Kant	puts	
it,	“had	not	the	moral	law	already been	distinctly	thought	in	our	reason,	
we	should	never	consider	ourselves	justified	in	assuming such	a	thing	
as	freedom	(even	though	it	is	not	self-contradictory)”	(KpV,	AA	5:5n),	
and	elsewhere:	“this	law	is	the	only	law	that	makes	us	conscious	of	the	
independence	of	our	power	of	choice	from	determination	by	all	other	
incentives	(of	our	freedom)”	(RGV,	AA	6:26n).
With	these	distinctions	in	place,	we	can	return	to	§91	with	a	new	
perspective.	On	a	second	look	it	is	clear	that	Kant	has	the	disclosure	
thesis	 in	mind	when	 he	 says	 freedom	 “can	 be	 established	 through	
practical	 laws	of	pure	 reason”	 (KU,	AA	5:648).	We	can	 then	qualify	
Kant’s	statement	 from	the	third	Critique	 in	 the	 following	way:	Strict-
ly	 speaking,	morality	 and	 freedom	 are	 one	 and	 the	 same	 from	 the	
viewpoint	of	the	reciprocity	thesis,	but	different	from	the	viewpoint	
of	the	disclosure	thesis.	That	is	to	say,	the	Faktum/Tatsache	of	moral	
consciousness	has	epistemic	priority	over	the	Faktum/Tatsache	of	free-
dom,	because	 it	 is	only	 through	 the	moral	 law’s	necessity	 (as	a	 law	
that	commands	“completely	a	priori”)	that	we	first	become	aware	of	
the	independence	of	our	power	of	choice.	Qualified	in	this	way,	it	is	
36.	 ‘Reciprocity	 thesis’	 is	Allison’s	phrase	 (Kant’s Theory of Freedom);	 ‘disclosure	
thesis’	is	my	own.
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and	natural	science	illustrate	the	reality	of	synthetic	a	priori	cognition,	
judgments	from	common	human	reason	illustrate	the	reality	of	moral	
consciousness	—	elevating	both	to	facts	that	neither	admit	nor	require	
further	proof.
6. A Final Objection: Skepticism About Moral Consciousness
As	I	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	paper,	many	commentators	in	Kant’s	
day	 and	 our	 own	 have	 found	 the	 second	Critique	 disappointing	 be-
cause	 the	 book’s	 argument	 begins	 where	 they	 think	 it	 should	 end:	
with	our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law.	If	this	alleged	“fact”	provides	
the	only	basis	for	inferring	that	pure	reason	is	practical,	it	appears	the	
scope	of	Kant’s	position	is	severely	limited.	It	will	not	persuade	a	skep-
tic,	for	example,	who	is	already	convinced	that	reason	is	conditioned	
by	empirical	motives	all	the	way	down.	Here	it	seems	all	the	skeptic	
has	to	do	in	order	to	refute	the	argument	of	the	second	Critique	is	deny	
what	Kant	treats	as	a	fact,	i. e.,	our	consciousness	of	an	absolute	practi-
cal	law.	A	skeptic	could	reply	that,	when	reflecting	upon	the	contents	
of	his	consciousness,	he	 is	only	aware	of	hypothetical	or	prudential	
imperatives	—	nothing	that	would	commit	him	to	affirm	a	higher	fac-
ulty	of	desire.	How	should	we	reply	to	this	line	of	criticism?
First	 of	 all,	Kant	 is	 ready	 to	 admit	 that	 our	 consciousness	 of	 the	
moral	law	is	“strange”	(befremdlich),	for	there	is	nothing	like	it	in	our	
entire	 field	 of	 practical	 cognition.	When	we	 attend	 to	 the	 necessity	
of	the	moral	law,	we	are	led	to	see	that	it	wholly	excludes	empirical	
motives	 from	 entering	 into	 our	maxims.	No	 other	 principle	—	hypo-
thetical	 or	 prudential	—	has	 this	 unconditional	 character.	 For	 Kant,	
however,	skepticism	about	the	reality	of	moral	consciousness	can	only	
arise	from	a	certain	standpoint:	the	standpoint	of	abstract	speculation.	
Indeed,	Kant	makes	this	clear	in	the	second	Critique	when	he	says	that	
only	philosophers	 can	make	 the	 question	 of	 pure	morality	 “doubtful”	
(zweifelhaft)	 (KpV,	AA	5:155).	 In	another	work	he	 tells	us	why:	Only	
those	“who	are	accustomed	merely	to	explanations	by	natural	scienc-
es	will	not	get	into	their	heads	the	categorical	imperative	from	which	
these	 laws	 proceed	 dictatorially,	 even	 though	 they	 feel	 themselves	
this	as	Henrich	and	Proops	have.	But	at	the	level	of	details,	Proops’s	at-
tempt	to	read	such	procedures	into	the	second	Critique	runs	up	against	
major	difficulties.	For	instance,	if	we	interpret	Kant’s	Faktum	solely	in	
terms	of	an	analogy	to	eighteenth-century	criminal	law,	we	are	forced	
to	demote	the	status	of	moral	consciousness	 to	something	allegedly	
the	case,	so	as	to	make	Kant’s	Faktum	fit	the	idea	of	legal	evidence	bear-
ing	“defeasible,	non-demonstrative	force”.	To	do	so,	however,	is	com-
pletely	at	odds	with	the	text	and	spirit	of	the	second	Critique,	where	
Kant	repeatedly	affirms	that	the	moral	law	is	“apodictically	certain”	and	
“firmly	established	of	itself”	(KpV,	AA	5:47).	By	contrast,	the	notion	of	a	
scientific	fact	that	emerged	with	the	British	experimentalists	puts	this	
epistemic	ultimacy	in	its	proper	light.	For	writers	like	Boyle,	matters	of	
fact	were	elevated	from	the	category	of	things	allegedly done,	and	so	ca-
pable	of	proof,	to	that	of	things	actually the case,	and	so	demanding	no	
proof.	On	the	whole,	this	makes	the	scientific	analogy	I	have	uncov-
ered	a	better	tool	than	the	legal	analogy	for	interpreting	Kant’s	Faktum.
The	scientific	analogy	also	 illuminates	Kant’s	 strategy	of	 justifica-
tion	within	his	critical	philosophy	at	 large.39	When	Kant	claims	 that	
our	consciousness	of	the	moral	law	requires	no	proof,	we	need	only	
recall	that	a	year	earlier	he	had	used	this	language	in	his	theoretical	
philosophy,	 stating	 that	 “we	 can	 content	 ourselves	with	 having	 dis-
played	[dargelegt]	 the	pure	use	of	our	cognitive	faculty	as	a	 fact	[den 
reinen Gebrauch unseres Erkenntnivermgens als Tatsache]”	(B5).	As	I	have	
shown,	there	is	a	continuity	in	the	argument-structure	of	these	texts.	
By	 attending	 to	 the	 epistemic	necessity	 in	 the	 concept	of	 space,	 for	
example,	we	can	see	that	it	must	spring	from	a	pure	(rather	than	an	
empirically	 conditioned)	 faculty	 of	 intuition.	 Likewise,	 by	 attending	
to	the	deliberative	necessity	in	the	moral	law,	we	can	see	that	it	must	
spring	 from	 a	 pure	 (rather	 than	 an	 empirically	 conditioned)	 faculty	
of	desire.	Finally,	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	examples	 from	mathematics	
39.	For	instance,	much	of	what	I	am	saying	about	Kant’s	strategy	of	justification	
in	the	second	Critique	resonates	with	Ameriks’s	reading	of	the	transcendental	
deduction	in	the	first	Critique.	See	his	“Kant’s	Transcendental	Deduction	as	
a	Regressive	Argument”.	 Limits	 of	 space	prevent	me	 from	exploring	 these	
similarities	further.
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separate	duty	from	happiness,	and	acknowledge	the	former’s	author-
ity,	is	evident	by	experiment,	even	if	not	known	by	deduction.	How-
ever	strange	our	moral	consciousness	may	be	from	the	standpoint	of	
speculation,	 it	 is	a	 fact	we	can	grasp	 from	a	practical	point	of	view.	
For	Kant,	then,	it	is	only	when	we	guide	ourselves	by	this	fact,	and	do	
so	as philosophers,	that	we	can	finally	reconcile	in	our	heads	what	we	
already	know	in	our	hearts.40
Abbreviations
In	the	case	of	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	I	follow	the	standard	practice	
of	referring	to	the	1781	(A)	and	1787	(B)	editions.	For	all	other	texts,	ci-
tations	appear	in	the	order	of	abbreviation,	volume	number,	and	page	
number	 from	 the	Akademie Ausgabe	 (AA),	Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 
edited	 by	 Königlich Preussische akademie der Wissenschaften	 (29	 vols.	
Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	1902—).	All	translations	come	from	The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,	edited	by	Paul	Guyer	and	Allen	
W.	Wood	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992—).	Where	I	
depart	from	them,	I	add	‘modified’	after	the	in-text	citation.
GMS  Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten	(AA	4),	Groundwork 
for the Metaphysics of Morals,	trans.	Mary	Gregor.
KpV  Kritik der praktischen Vernunft	 (AA	 5),	Critique of Practical 
Reason,	trans.	Mary	Gregor.
KU   Kritik der Urteilskraft	(AA	5),	Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
trans.	Paul	Guyer	and	Eric	Matthews.
40.	The	 ideas	 that	 led	 to	 this	 paper	were	 a	 result	 of	 conversations	 I	 had	with	
Paul	Franks	while	I	was	a	graduate	student	at	the	University	of	Toronto.	This	
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ful	feedback	on	earlier	drafts.	Many	thanks	to	Karl	Ameriks,	Anthony	Bruno,	
Robert	Clewis,	Ben	Crowe,	Robert	Hanna,	Dai	Heide,	Michelle	Kosch,	Lara	
Ostaric,	Evan	Tiffany,	Leah	Ware,	Benjamin	Yost,	Ariel	Zylberman,	and	two	
anonymous	reviewers	for	this	journal.	I	also	owe	a	special	debt	of	gratitude	
to	Kristin	Gjesdal	for	reading	multiple	drafts	of	this	paper,	and	for	expressing	
enthusiasm	in	my	project	from	the	beginning.
compelled	 irresistibly	by	 it”	 (MS,	AA	6:378).	 In	 this	way	 skepticism	
about	moral	consciousness	can	only	arise	for	those	who	seek	to	defend	
the	“omnipotence	of	theoretical	reason”	(MS,	AA	6:378).	Although	our	
cognition	of	 the	moral	 law	 is	 “distinct”	 and	 “irrepressible”,	 such	phi-
losophers	will	nevertheless	try	to	“shut	their	ears”	to	it	for	the	sake	of	
protecting	their	speculative	interests	(KpV,	AA	5:35).
Kant	distills	this	point	in	his	1793	essay	“On	the	Common	Saying:	
That	May	Be	Correct	in	Theory,	but	it	is	of	No	Use	in	Practice”.	Here	
we	 find	 him	 responding	 to	 Christian	Garve’s	 confession	—	from	 his	
1792	Essays	—	that	he	readily	grasps	the	separation	between	duty	and	
happiness	in	his	head,	but	loses	it	entirely	in	the	strivings	of	his	heart.	
In	reply	Kant	writes	with	a	note	of	humor	that	he	feels	no	hesitation	
in	contradicting	Garve	and	“championing	his	heart	against	his	head”	
(TP,	AA	8:285).	As	a	man	of	integrity,	Kant	adds,	Garve	has	“actually 
found this	separation	in	his	heart	every	time	(in	his	determination	of	
will),	only	it	would	not	be	reconciled	in	his	head”	(TP,	AA	8:285).	In	
other	words,	Garve	is	unable	to	reconcile	the	“possibility	of	categorical	
imperatives	(such	as	those	of	duty	are)”	with	what	Kant	calls	the	prin-
ciples	of psychological	explanation,	“all	of	which	have	the	mechanism	
of	natural	necessity	as	their	basis”	(TP,	AA	8:285).	It	is	only	from	the	
standpoint	of	theory,	then,	that	Garve	can	find	obscure	what	he	knows	
clearly	and	distinctly	from	the	standpoint	of	practice.
This	is	the	critical	part	of	the	reply	I	imagine	Kant	would	have	us	
give	to	the	skeptic.	We	must	show	that	the	skeptic’s	demand	to	verify	
the	 Fact	 of	Reason	with	 further	proof	 is	 unfounded.	 It	 rests	 on	 the	
mistaken	 conviction	 that	 all	 facts,	 including	 facts	 of	 consciousness,	
must	conform	to	 theoretical	standards	of	explanation	(“all	of	which	
have	the	mechanism	of	natural	necessity	as	their	basis”).	From	what	
Kant	 says,	however,	 there	 is	also	a	 constructive	 reply	we	can	bring	
forth,	and	this	may	be	the	deeper	lesson	of	his	doctrine	of	the	Fact	of	
Reason.	If	we	are	to	cease	defending	the	omnipotence	of	theoretical	
reason,	we	must	learn	to	philosophize	in	a	different	way,	and	I	take	
it	this	is	what	Kant	would	have	us	do	by	adopting	a	method	“similar	
to	 that	 of chemistry”	 (KpV,	 AA	 5:163).	 The	way	 people	 immediately	
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